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ScienceDirectRight-wing populist parties have been particularly successful in
East-Central Europe in the second decade of the 21st century.
We explain this phenomenon using a demand—supply
framework. We review studies about characteristics of East-
Central European nationalism and intergroup tensions with
minorities on the psychological demand side and the anti-
immigrant political discourse on the political supply side. We
conclude that the success of right-wing populism can be
explained by a high, but unstable national identity in the
region’s countries based on the experiences of the fragile
national sovereignty, the deeply embedded and socially
acceptable (i.e. normative) intergroup hostilities with minorities
(especially toward the Roma minority), and the effective use of
immigrant threat in this context.
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Successful mobilization by nationalist far-right politics is
not unique to East-Central Europe (i.e. the former social-
ist countries of Europe), as far-right parties have been
massively successful in Western Europe as well. In fact,
support for genuine far-right parties (e.g. Greater Roma-
nia Party, Slovakian National Party, Ataka in Bulgaria)
tends to be more volatile in East-Central Europe than in
the West. However, these parties endorse ideologies far
more extreme than their Western European counterparts.
The main difference is that nationalistic and exclusionist
discourses of populist right-wing parties are mainstream
and represent the center of the political spectrum in East-
Central Europe [1,2,3]. In line with this, mainstreamwww.sciencedirect.com right-wing populist parties have turned ideologically and
rhetorically into genuine far-right parties, especially since
the refugee crisis in 2015 [4]. Indeed, the rise of right-
wing populism corresponded with the trend of growing
ethnic nationalism only in this region, according to data
from consecutive waves of the International Social Survey
Programme [5].
To further elaborate the differences, firstly we must
acknowledge that right-wing populism in East-Central
Europe is embedded in the historically unstable national
identities based on territorial insecurities, whereas West-
ern European right-wing populism capitalizes from inter-
group conflicts within the national contexts. Right-wing
nationalist ideologies are therefore inseparable from ter-
ritorial revisionism and the fear of extinction of the nation
(i.e. collective angst) [6]. According to Minkenberg [2],
this can be explained by the unfinished process of nation-
building in East-Central Europe which is connected to its
turbulent history in which most of the time, nations
experienced limited or no sovereignty. Secondly, conser-
vatism is ideologically and psychologically different in the
region than in Western Europe, due to the heritage of
socialism. Core conservative attitudes (resistance to
change and anti-egalitarianism) are often connected to
a wish to ‘be taken care of’ by a powerful authority on
both sides of the political spectrum due to socialist
nostalgia [7]. Conservativism in this sense is more dis-
persed on the political spectrum, and strongly attached to
fear of change and norm-violating or culturally different
out-groups [8]. In this context, right-wing populist leaders
can successfully emerge as ‘entrepreneurs of identity’
(i.e. leaders who depict themselves as representing the
experiences of their followers, rather than as skillful
leaders or politicians, see Ref. [9]), exploiting fears of
cultural changes.
For these reasons, anti-democratic political trends can
especially effectively deepen social, economic, and polit-
ical divides and fuel prejudice in this historically unstable
region. In the current review, building on the concept of
nationalism, existing intergroup tensions with historical
minorities (e.g. Roma people and other minority national
groups), and the recent emergence of anti-immigrant
political discourse, we explain the success of right-wing
populism by a demand—supply match (for a review of
far-right politics from a supply—demand approach, see
Refs. [10,11]. Although the demand—supply dynamic is a
universal model for right-wing populism, as it takes hold
in unstable social contexts and amid identity fearsCurrent Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2020, 34:29–33
30 Emotion, motivation, personality and social sciences *political ideologies*throughout the world, in this paper we investigate the
unique historical and social characteristics that character-
ize the region and generate locally relevant questions
regarding the rise of right-wing populism.
To address these local questions, on the demand side, we
review recent work on national identity and nationalism,
describe the nature of prejudice toward historical minori-
ties and other target groups as the psychological ante-
cedents of right-wing populism, and on the supply side,
we show how threat messages used by right-wing populist
politicians in the mainstream could lead to unprece-
dented levels of xenophobia even in the absence of
tangible immigration boosting the popularity of radical
right parties (for a visual presentation of the process, see
Figure 1).
The demand Side
National identity and nationalism in East-Central Europe
Theories of national identity distinguish between posi-
tive attachment to one’s nation on the one hand, and an
exclusionary, inflated, and uncritical view of the national
ingroup on the other (building on Adorno et al.’s [12]
distinction of true and pseudo-patriotism). This distinc-
tion indicates that nationalism is not simply a stronger
form of identification, but something qualitatively
different. Studies about collective narcissism capture
the ambiguity of a strong, but unstable ingroup identity
and suggest that nationalism requires constant defendingFigure 1
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The circular connection between nationalism, intergroup prejudice that
makes people susceptible to threat, which leads to growing right-wing
populism that.
Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2020, 34:29–33 [13]. This need creates hostility toward all people who
represent an internal or external threat to the group [14].
The salience of national identity and nationalism in East-
Central Europe has been shown in a number of recent
studies. A study conducted among Polish participants
revealed a stronger connection between collective narcis-
sism and external threat (in the form of belief in anti-
Polish international conspiracies) than between ingroup
positivity and external threat. When collective narcissism
was accounted for, ingroup positivity was no longer con-
nected to these beliefs [15]. In contrast, in the context of
Hungary, Kende, Hadarics and Szabo´ [16] showed that
both the mode of identification (attachment versus glori-
fication) and the content of identity (nation versus Eur-
ope) matter: ingroup glorification always predicted higher
hostility, however, there was a difference between attach-
ment with Europe and attachment with Hungary. The
first predicted positive, whereas the latter predicted neg-
ative attitudes toward immigrants. In Slovakia, one study
found that the perception of a cultural threat to identity
was a strong predictor of negative attitudes towards
refugees — unlike perceived economic threat and mod-
ern racism that did not add anything to the explanatory
value of identity-based cultural threat [17]. From
these studies, it seems that prejudice and intergroup
hostility are rooted in both nationalism and its milder
form of national attachment or cultural identity in the
region, underlining that exclusive nationalism is more
mainstream in the region.
The stronger connection between national identity and
intergroup hostility may be explained by the specific
content of national identity. Definitions of the nation
as an imagined community reflect the unique character-
istics of the historical, political, and cultural context [18]
that individuals adapt to different degrees. If membership
in a nation is defined in exclusive terms, a mere sense of
belonging can also predict intergroup hostility [19]. Citi-
zens of Western countries embrace their national pride in
democratic political institutions more strongly than citi-
zens in Eastern countries [20], suggesting the existence of
differences in national identity content that in turn can
affect intergroup attitudes and hostility.
Prejudice against historical minorities
In East-Central Europe, questions of belonging have
been contested for national minorities even before the
birth of nation states. Ethnic tensions have been ampli-
fied by the peace treaties of the First World War – which
redrew all borders of East-Central Europe – and the
repression of the communist regime. Anxieties connected
to social transformations regarding national citizenship in
the post-communist period have shaped political deci-
sions regarding minorities. This is most prominently
reflected in punitive solutions in connection with the
Roma, the largest ethnic minority group of the regionwww.sciencedirect.com
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ual-level attitudes clearly indicate that prejudice against
various out-groups have been high in the region compared
to other parts of Europe in the past decades (Special
Eurobarometer, 2015: https://data.europa.eu/euodp/en/
data/dataset/S2077_83_4_437_ENG), and closely con-
nected to national identity [22].
The level of prejudice is not simply an aggregate of
individual attitudes of a country’s citizens. Prejudice
(the way it is expressed and the choice of its targets) is
also a strategic expression of ingroup identity in the sense
that intergroup attitudes can be both unacceptable forms of
behavior (i.e. prejudice) and acceptable forms of conduct
[23]. This means that the harsh treatment of certain groups
can be considered a rational response to perceived norm
violations and not considered problematic. This is particu-
larly relevant for prejudice against Roma people (i.e. anti-
gypsyism, for the term, see European Commission against
Racism and Intolerance, https://www.coe.int/en/web/
european-commission-against-racism-and-intolerance/
recommendation-no.13) in East-Central Europe. It is rec-
ognized as a form of prejudice when it is manifested in
violence, but it is generally tolerated when expressed as
‘reasonable antigypsyism’ [24].
Roma people (also referred to as Gypsies) constitute the
largest ethnic minority group in Europe, making up 5–
10% of the population in Slovakia, Romania, Hungary,
Serbia and Bulgaria [25]. Despite a long, shared history
with the Roma in East-Central Europe, Roma people
represent a marginalized social group that faces discrimi-
nation in all areas of social life [26]. Recent studies
conducted in Hungary and Slovakia found that prejudice
against the Roma is highly normative and acceptable.
This is underlined by the way prejudice is expressed
against them, that is, through traditional negative stereo-
types, and the fact that people do not adjust their level of
prejudice to external expectations [27]. La´sˇticova´ and
Findor [28] point to the risks and limitations of relying
on individualistic approaches when trying to reduce prej-
udice in highly hostile social contexts. Orosz et al. [29]
offer additional support for the importance of social norms
in shaping attitudes toward the Roma by demonstrating
the predominantly negative content of personal dis-
courses about Roma people consisting of negative stereo-
types, threats and dehumanization. Decades of antigyp-
syism research suggest that antigypsyism is a stable
attitude consisting of traditional negative stereotypes
and held by the majority of the population in all countries
of East-Central Europe [30,31].
It must be noted that antigypsyism and hate crimes
against Roma people are common in other parts of Europe
too. What makes the context different is that antigypsy-
ism has become the cornerstone of political mobilization
in some countries, such as in Hungary, Slovakia, andwww.sciencedirect.com Bulgaria [3,32]. This was enabled by a normative context
that is permissive with antigypsyism and prejudice
against groups that are perceived as norm-violating or
culturally different [7]. Against this historical and political
backdrop, fears over the emergence of the arrival of ‘new
strangers’ only exacerbated the general animosities
towards minorities, and mobilized people’s generalized
prejudice [33], making prejudice and the norms of
prejudice expression the link between nationalism and
right-wing populism.
The supply side
AccordingtoresultsdrawnfromtheEuropean SocialSurvey,
positive attitudes toward immigration appear in countries
with a larger Muslim immigrant population, more liberal
integration policies, and greater state support of different
religious practices [34]. In line with this, hostility toward
Muslim immigrants is highest in countries unaffected by
immigration and terrorism, such as in East-Central Europe
[35]. In this region, we can observe a form of ‘Platonic
Xenophobia’ (i.e. hatred of Muslim populations without
their presence, (https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/
hungary/2015-07-30/scaling-wall), or the fight against the
‘imaginary Muslims’ (https://www.brookings.edu/research/
imaginary-muslims-how-polands-populists-frame-islam/).
The path chosen by most East-Central European countries
in response to the refugee crisis of 2015was the politicization
of immigrant threat and the mobilization of the electorate
based on these messages [36,37]. This rhetoric is not unique
to the region (see for example the case of Italy: https://www.
brookings.edu/research/muslims-in-the-west-and-the-rise-
of-the-new-populists-the-case-of-italy/), but in the de facto
absence of immigrant populations from Muslim countries, it
is merely a psychological manipulation based on the histori-
cally foundedfear of the nation’s disappearance and threat to
its sovereignty (i.e. collective angst) which are genuine
historical experiences of people in this region. In East-
Central Europe, where national sovereignty has been con-
tested and fears over territorial losses are still strong, nation-
alistpopulismcanmobilizeagainstminoritiesbasedonthese
particular fears [2] rather than for example economic threat.
Traditionally, mobilization against historical minorities,
such as Jews, the Roma and national minorities was the
dominant strategy of radical right parties. Therefore, the
influx of refugees to Europe from the Middle East in
2015 gave momentum to populist radical right parties who
could capitalize on existing prejudices [38] and the nor-
mative contexts that allow the open expression of preju-
dice. The political exploitation of immigrant threat led to
spectacular electoral successes for populist right-wing
parties. It is not surprising that anti-Muslim and anti-
immigrant rhetoric helped secure the electoral victory of
two mainstream parties (PIS in Poland and Fidesz in
Hungary) and created space for the rise of xenophobic
players in the mainstream – contrary to Western Europe
where mainly the radical parties could capitalize from theCurrent Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2020, 34:29–33
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rhetoric in Hungary, at a time when Europe was still
dominated by ‘wilkommenskultur’, exceeded expecta-
tions. However, apart from the Law and Justice Party
in Poland and Fidesz in Hungary, other politicians who
exploited anti-immigrant sentiments had electoral suc-
cesses as well, such as Czech President Milosˇ Zeman in
2018 (http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/156782/1/156782.pdf). Say-
yid [39] argues that the Czech case fits well into the
pattern that Islamophopic mobilization works well in
countries where the Muslim minority is negligible, but
people can be mobilized by threat. The author recalls that
President Zeman warned Czech citizens about a
‘superHolocaust’ that Muslim refugees were planning.
Recent studies, using opinion poll data and international
databases, suggest that xenophobic propaganda by right-
wing populist politicians, representing mainstream poli-
tics in most East-Central European countries, did not
only coincide with the successful mobilization of voters,
but also with an increase in intolerance. Thereby, we can
assume that propensity to external threat due to the
unstable contents of national identity can be described
not just as a linear process, but also as a circular one (see
Figure 1). The most recent waves of ESS data suggest
that the refugee crisis has deepened the gap between the
prejudice levels in new (Eastern) and older (Western)
member states of the EU (http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/
bueros/budapest/14181-20180815.pdf), despite the fact
that Western Europe was much more exposed to the
refugee crisis as the real target of asylum-seekers. Com-
parative research shows that hostile attitudes towards
immigrants have become much stronger in some East-
Central European countries than in most Western coun-
tries [40]. In all of the Visegrad countries (Czech Repub-
lic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia), a significant rise in
xenophobia was measured [41].
Conclusions
Using the demand—supply framework to capture the
match between the psychological needs of individuals
and the dominant political discourse and success of parties,
we reviewed the concept of nationalism and issues related
to prejudice in the context of East-Central Europe, and the
recent success of the use of anti-immigrant rhetoric by
right-wing populist parties. We have shown that although
the demand—supply framework may be a universal char-
acteristic of right-wing populist mobilization, both sides
have unique elements in the East-Central European
region. The psychological demand is different because
national identity has been historically unstable, encapsu-
lating a genuinely founded fear ofextinctionboth culturally
and territorially, making East-Central European citizens
susceptible to collective narcissism and nationalist ideolo-
gies. Because of the content and instability of national
identity that needsconstantdefending, theharsh treatment
of ethnic and national minority groups tends to be sociallyCurrent Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2020, 34:29–33 permissible, easily justified, and even mainstream. In this
normative context intergroup hostility is not even neces-
sarily recognized as prejudice. This is evidenced by the
marginalized position and policies regarding Roma people
and tensions with national minority groups in the region,
but also by the more exclusive policies against refugees.
Within this context, right-wing populist leaders could not
make extreme claims about the threat immigration from
Muslim countries represent that was not acceptable for a
broad public, and consequently capitalize on the influx of
refugees in Europe in 2015 to a greater degree than any
Western European political movements did, even in the de
facto absence of immigrants, refugees or a culturally differ-
ent Muslim population.
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